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aBstraCt
In Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa argues for a particular methodology—what he 
calls ‘metaphysical analysis’—whose aim is to provide a specific sort of  explanation of  
knowledge—a metaphysical explanation—. As I read it, this revolutionary step points 
to the bulk of  the ontological dispositional web that necessarily sustains a virtue 
epistemology, contributes to a proper understanding of  accidentality in epistemology, 
and breaks the hold of  Humean contingency. I will argue that Sosa’s account of  the 
constitution of  knowledge is not only able to rule out apparent counterexamples to a 
robust virtue epistemology, as well as to combine rational integration and knowledge 
explanation, but that also breaks the Pyrrhonian (and internalist) impasse. I will also 
argue that a principled distinction between cases of  knowledge and cases of  mimicking 
is unavailable to anti-luck virtue epistemologists, so that they face a dilemma between 
their theory collapsing into a robust virtue epistemology or its collapsing into a 
form of  nomic virtue epistemology. What binds anti-luck virtue epistemologies and 
nomic theories together is a common problem in binding, one that is absent from a 
theory, such as Sosa’s theory, that locates knowledge in the domain of  higher-order 
competences and rational guidance.
KEyWords: Anti-luck virtue epistemology; dispositional directedness; Humean 
contingency; mimics; nomic necessities.
rEsuMEn
En Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa defiende una metodología específica —a la que 
denomina ‘análisis metafísico’— cuya función es la de proporcionar una explicación 
particular del conocimiento —una explicación metafísica—. Se trata de un procedi-
miento significativo, que apunta a la red disposicional que necesariamente sostiene 
a la epistemología de virtudes, contribuye a la comprensión adecuada de la acciden-
talidad en epistemología, y rompe el dominio de la contingencia humeana. En este 
artículo argumento que la explicación que Sosa proporciona de la constitución del 
conocimiento, además de evitar aparentes contraejemplos para una epistemología de 
virtudes robusta y de combinar la explicación del conocimiento y la integración ra-
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cional, es una herramienta fundamental para contrarrestar las intuiciones pirrónicas 
(e internistas). También argumento que la ‘epistemología de virtudes anti-suerte’ es 
incapaz de establecer una diferencia razonada entre casos de conocimiento y casos de 
acierto accidental debidos a la intervención de bloqueadores epistémicos (mimics), de 
forma que dicha teoría solo puede optar entre una epistemología de virtudes robusta 
y una epistemología de virtudes nómica. Es el problema de la combinación adecuada 
de los factores que contribuyen al conocimiento aquello que vincula epistemología de 
virtudes nómica y epistemología de virtudes anti-suerte. Dicho problema no existe en 
teorías como la de Sosa, teorías para las que el conocimiento es explicable en función 
de competencias de segundo orden y guía racional apropiada.
PaLaBras CLavE: Bloqueadores epistémicos; contingencia humeana; direccionali-
dad disposicional; epistemología de virtudes anti-suerte; necesidades nómicas.
Nomic theorists view laws of  nature as relations of  necessity that connect the 
dispositional nature and the behaviour of  objects, that is, as constituting nomic 
necessities that are metaphysically contingent, so that in other possible worlds 
under the jurisdiction of  different laws a target intrinsic disposition would yield 
different results from those obtaining in the actual world. It is the apparent fact 
that nomic theories seem to rule out accidentality and to provide a principled 
distinction between genuine manifestations of  dispositions and mimics by keeping 
the laws of  nature fixed that plausibly explains their significance, as well as their 
pull on some developing varieties of  virtue epistemology.
Anti-luck virtue epistemologists are not prima facie committed to a nomic theory. 
However, their account faces such a pressure from mimics that it might easily 
develop nomic responses to that challenge to counter internal disintegration. More 
importantly, what binds anti-luck virtue epistemologies and nomic theories together 
is a common problem in binding: a common ground of  assumptions that make 
proper combinations, either in epistemology or in ontology, impossible; a particular 
way of  conceiving extrinsic factors for the constitution of  knowledge such that it 
contains an unequivocal rejection of  internal relations and intrinsic competences. By 
arguing against a nomic virtue epistemology I will focus as much on the Humean 
contingency that permeates both views as I will do on the categorical nomic profile 
that an anti-luck virtue epistemology would take when cornered.
The main objective of  this paper is, however, positive. It seems to me that 
the full significance (and the ontological depth) of  Sosa’s comprehensive view 
can be better appreciated against a background of  alternative models that, while 
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preventing rational integration and knowledge explanation, seem to be imperative. 
This paper aims at tracing connections, and thus, at underlining the systematic 
character and broad scope of  Sosa’s philosophy.
Here is the plan. After presenting the notion of  ‘metaphysical analysis’ and 
contrasting it with some versions of  Humean contingency in epistemology 
(section 1), I will consider, in section 2, a prominent counterexample to robust 
virtue epistemology that seems to provide an excellent reason for introducing 
a new variety of  epistemic luck incompatible with knowledge (environmental 
luck) and thus for supporting an anti-luck virtue epistemology. I will argue that 
the latter conclusion is premature, if  only because cognitive dispositions, being 
a relevant part of  anti-luck virtue epistemologies (the part that makes of  them 
members of  the general class ‘virtue epistemology’), invite questions about their 
nature and the role they play on this model to acquire knowledge. Dispositions 
open the path beyond conceptual analysis for anti-luck virtue epistemologists. 
What the latter could say on this issue is crucial for the viability of  their position. In 
section 3, I will argue that anti-luck virtue epistemologists are dialectically forced 
to conceive cognitive dispositions that under the appropriate circumstances result 
in knowledge either as extrinsic dispositions or as partially intrinsic dispositions. 
The trouble is that, either way, a principled (ontological) distinction between 
cases of  knowledge and cases of  mimicking is prevented. The anti-luck virtue 
epistemologist thus faces a dilemma between her theory collapsing into a robust 
virtue epistemology or its collapsing into a virulent form of  nomic virtue epistemology. 
Although the ontological commitments of  an anti-luck virtue epistemology have 
not, as far as I am aware, been made explicit, the proposed reconstruction is 
the only one that, to my mind, makes sense of  the theory. Finally, in section 4, 
I will consider Sosa’s way of  dealing with the counterexample of  section 2. The 
conclusion is that if  the measure of  success for a theory is its internal coherence, 
its ability to reconcile our intuitions with the metaphysical picture that it provides, 
and its capacity to resolve pressing philosophical puzzles, Sosa’s epistemology 
fares extremely well in all those respects. This article thus aims at contributing to 
the understanding of  accidentality in epistemology, by pointing to what appears to 
me as the bulk of  the ontological iceberg (or of  the dispositional web) that necessarily 
sustains a virtue epistemology, and by applying to epistemology the middle view 
‘between internalism and externalism’ that as early as in 1993 Sosa successfully 
developed for concept-acquisition.1
1 See Sosa (1993, 311-29).
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1. toWards MEtaPhysiCaL anaLysis
It is common to understand epistemic justification in terms of  internal 
rationality and of  the agent’s epistemic blamelessness. The problem of  the new 
evil demon for reliabilist accounts of  justification (Lehrer & Cohen 1983, 191-
207) stems from the intuition that, since the beliefs of  the demon’s victim would 
be justified independently of  her (unpropitious) emplacement, reliable belief-
forming processes are not even necessary conditions for justification. It thus seems 
as if  the intuition that justification is indicative of  truth were swamped by the 
equally strong intuition that justification is connected to an exercise of  rationality 
that, as such, is wholly isolated from external factors.
In his contribution to Epistemic Justification, Sosa addresses the new evil demon 
problem by differentiating subjective from objective justification in a manner that 
accommodates our intuitions (Bonjour & Sosa 2003, 156-65). His point is that the 
concept of  justification of  special interest for epistemologists goes well beyond 
the blamelessness and subjective justification (justification in terms of  the agent’s 
conforming to her deep epistemic standards) enjoyed even by brainwashed agents 
and by agents raised within an epistemic community that inculcates prejudices 
through cultural assimilation. It is such truth-conductive justification, one that could only 
be explainable by appealing to reliable processes external to the contents of  the 
believer’s experience, what the internalist conception of  justification fails to capture.2
Interestingly, Sosa manages to agree with the intuition that the demon’s victim 
is epistemically justified while reinterpreting such justification in the much stronger 
sense of  objective justification, and thus, while displaying a deep disanalogy 
between demon’s victims and brainwashed agents.
Unlike the latter, the former acquire and sustain their beliefs through cognitive 
dispositions that are virtuous in the actual world, where a belief-forming process is 
virtuous (it is an operative cognitive virtue) only if  it would produce a high ratio 
of  true beliefs (a ratio that, of  course, varies from domain to domain). Were the 
demon’s victims located in more congenial surroundings, their beliefs would not 
2 Something analogous happens when, at the beginning of  the Third Meditation, Descartes 
claims that even the cogito, in spite of  reaching the highest possible standing according to the 
Meditator’s deep epistemic standards, falls epistemically short. For Descartes, the epistemic 
status of  beliefs depends on the agent’s epistemic constitution. And such constitution is anything 
but internal to the subject’s experience.
For a reading of  Descartes’ epistemological project as an early variety of  virtue perspectivism, 
see (among many others) the chapter 7, “Human knowledge, animal and reflective”, of  Reflective 
Knowledge (Sosa 2009, 135-53). 
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only be adroit (as they are), but accurate, and even apt. One could thus plausibly 
claim that, according to Sosa’s earlier view, a hostile environment such as the 
demon’s world prevents a cognitive disposition to be manifested as knowledge,3 and, 
correlatively, that the possession on the part of  the agent of  a cognitive disposition 
does not depend on the satisfaction of  the conditions for its manifestation, 
conditions that might be blocked, inhibited or unavailable while the disposition 
is still there, in-waiting.4 One thing is to claim that a cognitive disposition is not 
operative. Quite another is to claim that, because inoperative, it does not exist.5
It thus seems as if  a would-be virtue epistemologist who either dissociates 
the environment from its pairing with intellectual virtues for mutual manifestation 
or makes of  it an extrinsic constituting part of  the virtue would have to face the 
problem of  how to accommodate within her view the concept of  adroitness. 
Given the central role that adroitness plays within a virtue epistemology and its 
substantive contents, finding a solution to this problem seems far from easy.
The thing is that in Judgment and Agency Sosa advances a theory of  competence 
(Sosa 2015, 95-106) that, while in keeping with his previous view, develops a 
broader and richer account of  its core contents.
Sosa defines a complete competence (Sosa 2015, 26-7, 95-6) in terms of  a triple-S 
profile (Seat/ Shape/Situation) such that a complete competence can be properly 
attributed to S when, in certain combinations of  shape and situation, her innermost 
(seat) competence is manifested in the success of  her performance. This means 
that the possession of  a complete competence is defined in terms of  the reciprocal 
partnership of  innermost competence (cognitive disposition), proper shape of  the 
agent (paying full attention, sober, awake…), and right environmental factors.6
3 This means that, though in the Demon World the subject’s intellectual virtues might still be 
manifested in the alethic affirmations and judgments that they would yield, they would fail to 
be manifested in the correctness of  those alethic affirmations and judgments. 
4 As the demon hypothesis makes clear, there are even logical placeholders for continuant inhibitors.
5 On this view, epistemic justification is thus external to the inner operations of  the agent, while 
also independent of  the instantiation of  the environmental factors to which an intellectual 
virtue is directed. Justified beliefs come from dispositions intrinsically directed to the truth that, 
however, might be prevented to be manifested as apt, and even as accurate beliefs.
6 The picture is somehow more complicated, since competences can be just reliable enough 
without being infallible. This means that even when all three S conditions are satisfied by a 
performance and the agent tries to attain the relevant objective, she might not do so. However, 
it is not clear to what extent this qualification can be rightly applied to cognitive competences 
highly independent of  medium and situation, to paradigm cases of  perception, or to epistemic 
performances (in general) where situation and shape are instrumental to explain failure. In any 
case, this further topic is tangential to the main argument.
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Notice, however, that the SSS profile only defines the conditions for the 
manifestation of  the innermost competence, a competence that, because it is retained 
by the performer even while absent the opportunity for manifesting it, does have, 
as well as a categorical character, a dispositional one. A complete competence is not 
thus a particular kind of  competence (among others), but a competence that is complete, 
to wit, the right manifestation of  a competence (or competences) relative to the 
results and their mode of  production of  interest for the describer.7 This means 
that factors pertaining to the shape and situation of  the agent such as the above 
mentioned might all be necessary, but not sufficient for getting knowledge. As Sosa 
makes perfectly clear by describing the “appropriate shape and situation” as the 
“background for archery shots” (Sosa 2015, 103), and, a fortiori, as the background 
for epistemic performances8, the cognitive disposition hosted by the agent will be 
the crucial factor for that. It is only putting the same point in other words to say that 
epistemic environments (environments relevant for the constitution of  knowledge) 
are either blockers (if  hostile) or (if  fortunate) conditions for the manifestation of  
dispositions. They shall never take intrinsic dispositions away nor create them.9
7 More on the perspectival nature of  our taxonomies later.
8 For reasons that I will later develop, I am not entirely satisfied with analysing manifestation 
in terms of  an unmanifested disposition that combines with a set of  background conditions. To 
my mind, this kind of  talk is technically loose. However, it is successful as a gesture to the right 
sort of  ontological picture, one where the distinction between the truthmakers of  a cognitive 
disposition and those of  its manifestations is front and centre. 
9 Dispositions are acquired and lost. They have causes. They form dispositional multi-level 
systems such that S has a disposition D1 to acquire a further disposition D2 whose content is 
different from that of  D1, and so on and so forth. However, the directedness and selectiveness 
of  a disposition is not its cause and cannot be explained by its cause. This means that the 
crucial factor to explain the success of  a shot is the skill of  the archer, and not how the skill 
was acquired. Etiological questions have become prominent in some (character) versions of  
virtue epistemology, with the subsequent confusion between the competences that constitute 
knowledge and the (non-constitutive) factors (which include ethical virtues) that are helpful to 
acquire and exercise those competences (cf. Sosa 2015, 41). The latter are not manifested in the 
result because they do not belong to the content and directedness of  the cognitive disposition.
The relevant point is, however, that reductive analyses of  dispositions in terms of  associated 
counterfactual conditionals that include a situational factor are unsuccessful, as C.B. Martin 
so forcefully demonstrated (Martin 2008, 12-23). By providing an analysis of  the conditions 
for the manifestation of  a disposition, the Simple Counterfactual Analysis takes for granted 
the disposition in question, so that it is unable to “reduce” it. As well as their environmental 
partners, dispositions have a life on their own. 
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It would be quite misleading to describe Sosa’s latest approach in terms of  a 
“ontological turn”, if  only because, since his main concern has always been that 
of  explaining the nature of  knowledge, he has never been affected by or attracted 
to ‘linguisticism in epistemology’. However, it seems also true that a particular 
methodology—what Sosa calls metaphysical analysis—whose aim is to provide a special 
sort of  explanation of  knowledge—a “metaphysical explanation” (Sosa 2015, 8)—has 
increasingly come to be at the center of  his project. Sosa’s ontological turn should 
not thus be considered as a philosophical shift, but as an expansion in depth of  his view.
As I read it, one important aspect of  metaphysical explanations is that they 
are reducible neither to explanations in terms of  the conjunction of  independent 
factors—the kind of  result characteristic of  what Sosa calls “factorizing analysis” 
(Sosa 2015, 16)—nor to causal relations where the relata are systematically but 
contingently connected. This means that the kind of  dispositional analysis of  
knowledge provided by Sosa is such that, though it would be contingent that 
the dispositional partners from which knowledge comes exist and combine at all, it 
would not be contingent that such combination results in knowledge (as it would 
not be contingent that, given their respective dispositions, sugar dissolves in water, 
however contingent is the existence of  sugar and water). If  an internal relation is 
defined as founded on its relata in such a way that, as John Heil puts it, “if  you 
have the relata, you thereby have the relation” (Heil 2012, 94), then a metaphysical 
analysis is the sort of  procedure that makes internal relations explicit. Dispositionalities 
are paradigm ‘objects’ for such analysis.
Humean contingency permeates contemporary epistemologies, even if  they 
are lucky enough to escape the impact of  ‘linguisticism’. It is expressed in the view 
that dispositions are causal relations connecting two logically independent events 
(belief  and success). It informs nomic theories of  dispositions, those according to 
which dispositions are partly conferred by the extant (and contingent) laws of  
nature.10 It is curiously present, or so it seems, at the core itself  of  some varieties 
of  virtue epistemology as the view that knowledge is a target that dispositional partners 
cannot get on their own, so that the unbridgeable gap between cognitive achievement 
and knowledge is always filled (if  at all) by the grace of  nature, that is, by a fortunate 
environment that is never able to properly combine with the corresponding virtue 
(where a ‘proper combination’ is one founded on the nature of  the relata). Anti-
10 For a view of  laws of  nature as dyadic relations of  necessity that hold between (first-order) 
universals and that are themselves contingent states of  affairs, see (Armstrong 1983, 158-71).
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luck conditions for knowledge thus seem contingent conditions for knowledge. As 
such, they are not capturable by metaphysical analysis.
Let us distinguish two senses of  ‘capturable’. It seems obvious that the 
richness of  a dispositional base cannot be fully apprehended by a limited number 
of  manifestations, and that, as Sosa is keen to underline (Sosa 2015, 26), even the 
right conditions for manifestation are not fully expressed in verbal formulas. This 
does not preclude, however, an analysis of  the structure of  knowledge, that is, an 
analysis of  its ultimate sources, of  their required ontological status, and of  the way 
they have to stand to each other for constituting knowledge.
By contrast, anti-luck virtue epistemologies are prima facie committed to the 
view that the structure of  knowledge is inapprehensible for the bare reason that 
there is no complete structure of  which knowledge would be the tip to apprehend. Anti-luck 
virtue epistemologists are undeniably in the business of  providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for knowledge. However, the modally propitious environment 
that they consider as one of  the crucial factors for explaining knowledge seems 
not to be itself  a part of  any structure, and thus, not a part of the structure that 
for a robust virtue epistemologist would constitute knowledge. The point is that, 
according to anti-luck virtue epistemology, skill and propitious environment 
are not for each other, that their relation is such that it is not built into the for-ness 
of  the dispositional partners. Neither the agent’s cognitive dispositions nor the 
environment are thus ready for knowledge. To my mind, this would mean that for 
anti-luck virtue epistemologists knowledge is groundless in the sense that it is not 
grounded on the reciprocity and mutual directedness of  its bases. Because it would 
not be founded on the nature of  the relata, knowledge would just be something 
that, under the right circumstances, happens. A brute fact, in short.11
11 Objection: “Anti-luck virtue epistemologists claim that they are providing sufficient conditions 
for knowledge. If  so, they would also be perfectly justified to claim that, since knowledge 
necessarily results from those conditions, knowledge is a relation founded on its relata (if  you 
have the relata, you thereby have the relation). Another way to put this point is by saying that, though 
detached, both ability and propitious environment are manifested in the very fact that one 
knows. Anti-luck virtue epistemologists thus accept the same degree of  contingency as robust 
virtue epistemologists do. No more. No less.”
Reply: Even if  anti-luck virtue epistemologists were right in claiming that, according to their 
view, the propitious environment and the relevant ability might well be manifested in knowledge, 
they would be providing a mereological account of  knowledge. Since knowledge is necessarily 
connected with those conditions, since this connection must be explained somehow, and since 
those constituents, conceived as atomic or detached parts, cannot explain the connection, 
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While it seems that for anti-luck virtue epistemologists knowledge comes 
from external relations that are, as such, contingent, the object of  metaphysical 
analysis is a combination such that, in virtue of  the intrinsic correlativeness and 
directedness of  their relata, necessarily results in knowledge. Metaphysical analysis 
has a limited place, if  any, in any variety of  anti-luck virtue epistemology. Which 
means that the (ontological) question as to what knowledge is tends among anti-luck 
virtue epistemologists to collapse into the (conceptual and epistemic) question 
about the rules that govern the use of  cognitive predicates, that is, about the 
conditions that have to be met for the application of  ‘knowledge’, to a subject, to 
be justified. These properties may not be the ones that determine the nature of  
knowledge. Contrary to metaphysical analysis, conceptual analysis neither aims 
at providing nor is able to provide on its own an ontological explanation (an 
explanation without remainder) of  why knowledge obtains. Metaphysical analysis is 
thus distinctive of  a bottom-up epistemology. The route from talk of  knowledge 
to the truthmakers for that talk is not conceptual.
2. a targEt too Far
Duncan Pritchard has vigorously advanced anti-luck virtue epistemology in a 
series of  publications.12 As he aptly notes, what is essential for this theory is that 
it is a dual-condition view, one that incorporates as conditions for knowledge the 
ability condition stressed by robust virtue epistemologists and the anti-luck condition 
characteristic of  safety-based epistemologies, and that, crucially, it incorporates 
them in such a way that “it accords each condition equal weight” as “they are each 
answering to a fundamental intuition about knowledge” (Pritchard 2010, 54). The 
anti-luck virtue epistemologists would see that connection as ‘magical’. What is required is 
an essentialist explanation of  how knowledge involves those constituents. Anti-luck virtue 
epistemologists fail thus to capture an internal relation, one which is essential to its relata. The 
thing is that, deprived of  such mutual disposition to combine, those factors are necessary for 
knowledge in the much restricted sense of  Humean necessity: as regularly and systematically 
providing knowledge. It is a mere accident that a propitious and non-correlative-with-the-
ability environment would result in knowledge when added to the ability: there is nothing there to 
explain why this necessarily happens (even if  as now, and for the sake of  the argument, one takes 
for granted that the addition of  a safe emplacement to apt beliefs yields knowledge). In such 
a case, there would be no rationale for the result to obtain, and thus, no genuine explanation of  
knowledge. If  you do not have the relata as relata (as potentially fitting each other), you only 
have an external relation—one that is not grounded on the relata at all—. 
12 See among others Pritchard (2009, 72-85), Pritchard (2010, 48-65), Pritchard (2012, 247-79).
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 3, n.º 2 (2016): 283-314
Modesto Gómez-Alonso292
crux is thus that the intuitions that underlie those conditions cannot (as often 
happens) be run together, or, in other words, that they cannot be reduced to each 
other as if  they were the two sides of  a simple intuition. Knowledge is incompatible 
with most (but not all) varieties of  luck. For many virtue epistemologists, the ability 
condition is enough to rule out all varieties of  luck incompatible with knowledge. 
Pritchard’s alternative view is motivated by what he sees as the failure of  the ability 
condition to accomplish this purpose on its own, without the addition of  a safety 
clause.13
It is crucial for Pritchard’s argument to clearly delineate cases of  cognitive 
achievement without knowledge.14 His celebrated analysis of  the case of  Barney 
(Pritchard 2010, 35-40), who acquires a true belief  that there is a barn in front of  
him through his cognitive abilities, while, unbeknownst to him, all the barns in the 
area but the one that is the target of  his belief  are ‘barn-façades’, provides such 
example. It seems intuitively correct to claim that Barney lacks knowledge. It also 
seems intuitive to claim that a reliable cognitive competence (visual perception) 
is manifested in the success of  his belief. Barney’s lack of  knowledge thus has to 
be explained by a factor extrinsic to the agent’s ability: by the fact that his beliefs 
are, relative to the circumstances, unsafe. The ability condition is thus unable to 
rule out what Pritchard calls environmental luck (Pritchard 2010, 50-1), the kind of  
luck that, incompatible with knowledge, is so conspicuous in the case of  Barney.
Robust virtue epistemologists, when confronted with this formidable 
challenge, may opt for digging in their heels and for ‘biting the bullet’, by refusing 
to concede that Barney lacks knowledge. This move strikes to me, however, as 
pretty desperate. They might, alternatively, opt for conceding that Barney lacks 
knowledge, while explaining this by appealing to the agent’s abilities, for instance, 
to the distinction between coarse-grained and fine-grained abilities. On this 
view, Barney lacks knowledge because his success does not manifest the ability 
to distinguish real barns from fake ones that would be required for achieving 
knowledge.
13 And the same goes for the safety condition when taken alone. It also fails to provide 
knowledge when the ability condition is not added to it, as Sosa argues when considering the 
case of  beliefs about necessary truths that, though automatically safe, do acquire the status of  
knowledge only if  properly based on a reliable cognitive competence (Sosa 2011, 85). 
14 And, conversely, to find cases of  knowledge without cognitive achievement. However, I will 
skip this part of  the overall argument against robust virtue epistemology because, in addition 
to being much more controversial than fake-barn scenarios, it is tangential to the main point 
of  the following discussion. 
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Maybe a view in very roughly this direction is, on further reflection, correct. 
However, this particular version does not seem too promising. On the one hand, 
it is far from clear what would be the distinction in terms of  first-order abilities 
between Barney and his counterpart in a safe environment. Granted that perception 
and recognitional powers work in tandem, Barney still is as successful in identifying 
that particular barn as a barn as his counterpart would be. Barney could, of  course, 
be charged with epistemic negligence, but this strategy, apart from raising epistemic 
standards too high (thus playing into the hands of  the sceptic), would entail that 
his counterpart is equally negligent while getting knowledge. More importantly, this 
move does not apply to cognitive powers, such as rational intuition, whose correct 
operation is (at least to a high degree) independent of  the epistemic quality of  
medium and environment. It is easy to see, for example, how a randomizing demon 
might be careless enough to allow his victim to form apt beliefs by using rational 
intuition while, due to the operating demon, those beliefs would easily be false.15 
In such a case, that parallels that of  Barney, the intuition that the victim’s demon 
lacks knowledge stands firm, while explanations in terms of  fine-grained abilities 
seem wholly unmotivated.16 Since the right explanation of  knowledge should be 
general and unified, the present version of  this general move seems to fall short of  
the challenge. The required level of  generality, as well as the bleak prospects of  
composite first-order abilities, also seem to indicate that if  there is a right place to 
look for a suitable candidate to explain knowledge (and the lack of  it) by factors 
intrinsic to the agent’s abilities, the domain of  higher-order competences is it.
It is clear that anti-luck virtue epistemologies add an independent safety 
condition for knowledge. It is far from clear, however, how their defenders 
translate intuitions into epistemic theories, more specifically, how they combine 
the ability condition with the safety condition in such a way that knowledge would 
thus be explained.
One (attractive) way of  reading their proposal would be as viewing statements 
attributing knowledge to S as linked to a complete set of  conditional statements, 
15 The randomizing demon, that Schaffer considers as one of  the main predecessors of  his 
debasing demon (Schaffer 2010, 231 n. 4), made his appearance in the case of  Lucky Strikes, 
that Sosa discusses in the section 6.6. (a section that, pre-dating anti-luck virtue theories, 
is curiously and premonitorily entitled “Lucky Knowledge?”) of  Epistemic Justification. See 
Bonjour & Sosa (2003, 115). 
16 If  only because simple necessary truths are apprehended solely on the base of  understanding 
them, without appeal to any other faculty or belief. This is a lesson from Descartes.
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where the set is defined by modal proximity. On this view, S would know that p 
at the target-occasion O1, if, within a modal area A, all the beliefs
17 acquired by 
S about the relevant class of  objects by using the same cognitive competence C 
would be apt.18
Notice that this analysis fits well with our intuitions regarding the epistemic 
distinction between Barney and his counterpart within a safe location. Unlike the 
former, whose beliefs would be mostly inapt (because they would be mostly false), 
all the relevant beliefs of  the latter would be apt. Notice too that cognitive abilities 
are neatly incorporated into this view, so that Pritchard seems perfectly justified in 
considering his theory as a modest virtue epistemology. However, on further reflection, 
this reading is beset by problems.
The first trouble comes from the fact that on this view a particular area seems 
to be defined as modally safe in terms of  a collection of  apt performances, so that the 
safety condition collapses into an ability condition such that, for a finite number 
of  cases, would not yield divergent results. It thus seems far from clear how an 
anti-luck virtue epistemology could accord each condition equal weight when the 
safety condition would seem nothing else that a sum of  apt beliefs.19
It is also intriguing to notice how, according to this interpretation, the very 
same performance gains or fails to gain knowledge for the agent depending on 
the truth-value of  counterfactuals. Consider a single apt performance in itself. 
Were the counterfactuals true, that performance would by itself  be enough to 
get knowledge. By contrast, the very same performance would never by itself  
be enough to get knowledge if  the counterfactuals were false. This suggests an 
absurd picture: it is as if  the right counterfactuals would modify the content of  the 
ability, by loading it with a directedness to knowledge of  which the ability is intrinsically 
deprived. The point is that, the target-ability being invariant, neither a single 
performance episode nor a collection of  similar performances are able to reach out 
beyond the intrinsic limits of  that ability. The target-abilities are paired to modally 
thin situations for their mutual manifestation. As such, a modally thick situation is 
17 Or ‘most of  them’, if  one opts for a less strict conception of  safety than the one endorsed 
by Pritchard. The following discussion is neutral to this further (and interesting) topic.
18 According to the standard use, a belief  is apt when a cognitive competence hosted by the 
performer is manifested in its accuracy (success).
19 This is fully compatible, however, with claiming that, even so, a modest virtue epistemology 
goes well beyond standard versions of  virtue epistemology. My point only concerns the 
consequences of  this reading for Pritchard’s ‘equality of  weight’. 
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always, whether one considers the performance alone or as relative to a collection 
of  counterfactuals, beyond them.
Knowledge is thus irreducible to conditionals involving apt beliefs. A reductive 
conditional analysis fails to capture the core of  the view proposed by anti-luck 
virtue epistemologists. A view that could be expressed by saying that, though it is 
not the environment (whether safe or not) what makes of  S’s belief  an apt belief, it 
is the safe environment what makes of  it knowledge. Knowledge exceeds aptness.
What would be then the role of  cognitive abilities for explaining knowledge? 
There is a ready-made answer. Beliefs that are accurate because competent are not 
lucky as beliefs whose accuracy is due to an extrinsic factor (a mimic) are. Abilities 
thus prevent a certain sort of  luck incompatible with knowledge, and in so 
doing, they select the right candidates for knowledge. Notice, however, that on 
this revised reading the safety condition is an independent condition that is not 
fulfilled by apt counterfactuals, so that the relevant factor for knowledge is a safe 
environment such that the target of  knowledge is always (where ‘always’ should be 
interpreted modally) out of  reach of  cognitive abilities alone. It is now when the 
distinction between the factor that explains why a belief  would be apt (the proper 
exercise of  a competence) and the factor that explains why a belief  would not easily 
be inapt (the safe environment) gains importance. When the set of  counterfactuals 
is considered, the right picture is that of  a collection of  apt performances that 
are tied together by a safe environment. When our consideration is limited to the 
actual performance, the correct picture is that of  an apt performance that is tied 
to knowledge by a safe environment. Knowledge is thus fully actual on any particular 
occasion. Talk about counterfactuals and possible worlds that make them true 
is nothing else that a useful form of  representation. Provided with a cognitive 
disposition base that is fully actual on the occasion, with a manifestation that 
shares the same feature, and with an environment that is anything but virtual, 
anti-luck virtue epistemologies are thus not necessarily burdened by an excessive 
package of  metaphysical commitments. The main point is, however, that the 
two conditions come together for knowledge without (in an ontological sense) 
combining together. Independence and equality are preserved, while knowledge, 
apparently, is fully explained.
The trouble for this view (coordination without combination) comes from mimics, 
that is to say, from those extrinsic factors that, incompatible with knowledge, make 
bogus competences appear as if  they were genuine.
Before starting the discussion, let us be clear on one crucial point. Our present 
worry is not about the epistemological problem of  how to discriminate between the bona 
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fide manifestation of  a competence and a mimic, nor about the sceptical challenge 
to the possibility for epistemic agents of  detecting and ruling out mimics. Our 
worry concerns the ontological distinction between those cases in which the agent’s 
successful performance is explained by her competence and those other cases in 
which, because the success is not attributable to the agent, it comes from chance. This 
distinction would stand fast even if  the Pyrrhonian problematic were intractable.20 
The problem is thus about the nature of  knowledge, and not about if  knowledge is 
humanly discernible. Our point will be that anti-luck virtue epistemologies threaten 
to undermine the ontological distinction, and thus, that, instead of  explaining what 
knowledge is, they make a new contribution to mimic-ology.
When C.B. Martin introduced interferences and finks in the literature 
about dispositions (Martin 1994, 1-8), it was with the objective of  providing 
counterexamples to the analysis of  dispositions in terms of  counterfactuals. 
Among the several cases of  interferences that undermine the conditional analysis, 
mimics are cases in which either a disposition ascription is false even if  its associated 
conditional is true (a diamond is not intrinsically disposed to turn into dust when 
lightly touched, even if  a powerful spell would make it true that if  the the diamond 
were lightly touched it would turn into dust) or, alternatively, cases in which, even 
if  the disposition ascription happens to be true, that is not the reason that makes 
the associated conditional true (a wire can be live and ready for manifestation 
20 Radical sceptics do not reject the ontological distinction, but our capacity to know whether 
our beliefs come from competences or not, and thus, our cognitive ability to improve our 
epistemic standing beyond mere natural inclinations. For them, our condition is similar to 
that of  “archers shooting at a target in the dark” (M viii, 325), so that, though some (or many, 
or even all) of  our evaluations are true, no one can properly claim that her evaluation is true. 
This also means that for the Pyrrhonians proper epistemic functions (of  the type currently 
endorsed by reliabilists such as Goldman), although they were objectively right, would never 
be sufficient to constitute knowledge. Knowledge is located by the Pyrrhonians on the meta-
level, so that even the man who enters into a dark room which, unbeknownst to him, only 
contains objects made of  gold would grasp a golden object by luck. This is just the sort of  
example that anti-luck virtue epistemologists fail to consider. One that is instrumental to 
show why first-order competences together with safe environments are not enough to make 
of  a success in such conditions something more than an accidental success (and not a case of  
knowledge), and that unambiguously points to the right direction of  enquiry: the domain of  
higher-order performances. There are more varieties of  luck in epistemology that anti-luck 
virtue epistemologists dream of.
For the long and deep involvement of  Sosa with the Pyrrhonian conception of  the structure 
of  knowledge, see (among others) Sosa (1997, 229-49), and Sosa (2015, 215-32). 
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while, because of  the trumping effect of  an electro-fink, that is not the right 
explanation for why the current is flowing).
Since cognitive competences are understood by virtue epistemologists in 
terms of  dispositional powers, mimics have become, unsurprisingly, prominent in 
recent literature. Consider, for example, Sosa’s case of  a benign angel (Sosa 2015, 
103), a case that falls under our first variety of  mimics: those that operate by faking a 
competence that does not exist.
BENIGN ANGEL. An epistemic agent is not intrinsically disposed to get it right 
on her perceptual belief  that p when so believing. However, a benign angel casts a 
spell that makes his perceptual belief  true, so that if  the agent were to believe that 
p, his belief  would be immediately true.
Consider now a variation of  the previous case that falls under the second variety 
of  mimics: those that operate by replacing a competence that, with the appropriate 
SSS profile, is ready for manifestation.
BENIGN ANGEL*. Situation and shape are such that, were the agent to form a 
perceptual belief  that p through competence, they would combine together as to 
render an apt belief. However, a benign angel interferes, so that, though the agent’s 
belief  is true, its truth is not due to her competence.
There are two important things to notice about the previous examples. First, 
mimics provide a causal explanation of  the performance’s success at the expense 
of  making it accidental. A target is thus accidentally hit for all the cases in which 
that outcome does not manifest the competence of  the agent. Second, cases 
of  mimicking are compatible with the fact that the agent regularly succeeds in 
acquiring true beliefs, so that she might have a system of  true beliefs as extensive 
as the describer stipulates while, because all of  them would be accidentally true, 
deprived of  knowledge. A spell is not less a spell because it makes all diamonds 
to turn into dust when lightly touched. A benign angel is not less a mimic because 
it interferes with all the beliefs of  all the epistemic agents. No external influence, 
whether it is regular or episodic, confers dispositions.
The thing is that for anti-luck virtue epistemologists competences always 
fall short of  the target of  knowledge, and that, according to their view, it is an 
external influence (the safe environment) that fills the gap between apt beliefs and 
knowledge. This suggests that, since no competence explains a cognitive success 
higher than that of  affirming correctly, hitting the target of  knowledge is always an 
accidental fact, and that, on this view, the safe environment is nothing else than the 
causal factor that provides a causal explanation for that outcome, just as mimics do.
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It eludes me how the safe environment might be the anti-luck factor in the 
analysis of  knowledge when the result is accidental, since it comes from no 
competence at all. It also eludes me how that accidental outcome could be called 
‘knowledge’ when ‘lucky knowledge’ is a contradictory expression. The challenge for 
the anti-luck virtue epistemologists is thus that of  providing us with good reasons to 
believe that the case of  Barney’s counterpart in a safe environment is not a case of  
mimicking. Why would a safe environment be different from a benign angel? Why 
would one confer knowledge while the other would be incompatible with it?
At this point, it might be tempting to think that, contrary to what happens 
in the case of  standard mimics, a safe environment neither replaces a cognitive 
competence nor makes it appear as if  the agent hosts a non-existent competence. 
After all, the safe environment, far from mimicking an ability, is a supplement to 
it, for the purpose of  explaining knowledge.
However, and as a consequence of  wrongly keeping first-order apt belief, 
instead of  knowledge, fixed, this response ignores one crucial consideration. The 
contrast is not here between the outcome of  a target-ability (visual perception) that 
is, by hypothesis, fully operative on the occasion and a mimic that would produce 
the same result, but between the outcome of  an ability that is yet to be determined 
such that the apt belief  would intuitively constitute knowledge and a mimic that 
would accidentally produce the same true belief. Curiously, the a priori rejection of  
such an ability to which anti-luck virtue epistemologists seem committed would 
be tantamount to the rejection of  the ontological distinction,21 and thus, to the 
claim that there is no knowledge at all. Falling short of  competence, knowledge just is 
an accidental fact causally explained by an external factor. In short, the result of  
a mimic. In short, anything except knowledge. On this view, first-order abilities 
prevent a certain sort of  luck at the cost of  making luck pervasive.22
21 Again, the ontological distinction does not entail any commitment to the claim that cases 
of  knowledge are (at least on some occasion) instantiated. The point is that there is a contrast 
between a situation such that knowledge would be achieved and cases of  mimicking, a contrast 
that holds even if  as a matter of  fact there were no cases of  knowledge. Knowledge and mimics 
are categories that stand or fall together. Each makes sense because the contrast between them makes 
sense. In this respect, anti-luck virtue epistemologists not only would be committed to claim that 
knowledge is impossible to acquire, but to the stronger claim that knowledge is unintelligible. This 
would result in an invitation to abandon, as well as epistemology, meta-epistemology. 
22 The trick from which the disanalogy between safe environment and mimics comes lies in 
contrasting the first-order operative competence with the agent’s emplacement. It is enough 
to notice that the modally thick environment should rightly be paired to the exercise of  an 
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It is also of  no avail to appeal to the distinction between the intentional agents 
such as wizards, benign angels and the omnipotent God of  the Cartesian lore 
that populate the literature on mimics, and a safe environment where no external 
agency is involved at all. Intentional imaginery is only employed for the purpose 
of  making a more vivid and dramatic picture of  the nature of  mimics. For making 
the same point, it could easily be replaced by neutral extrinsic factors, such as the 
extant laws of  nature (with no theistic underpinnings) and the dark rooms full 
of  objects made of  gold that come from the Pyrrhonian tradition. A mimic is 
an extrinsic factor (one that does not combine with the agent’s competence) that 
provides an explanation of  success such that the explanation entails accidentality, 
however the nature of  that factor could be.
Finally, and because, though a sporadic success is always an accidental one, an 
accidental success is not necessarily an episodic one, Barney’s counterpart is not 
less deprived of  knowledge than Barney is, no matter how many of  his relevant 
beliefs would be apt. On the one hand, his beliefs would fall short of  knowledge 
even if  all of  them were apt. On the other hand, all his beliefs would (while aptly 
formed within such an environment) be true, but accidentally so. A mimic is not 
less a mimic because it interferes with an extensive set of  beliefs, as well as a lucky 
shot is not less lucky because it is not a blind shot. A stable class of  true beliefs 
does not make knowledge.
This brings us to the underlying mistake of  anti-luck virtue epistemologists: 
that of  taking for granted that, without further qualifications, Barney’s counterpart 
really knows that there is a barn in front of  him.
Consider the following case.
DARK ROOM. Goldie steps into a pitch dark room that, unbeknownst to her, 
only contains objects made of  gold. Due to the the contents of  the room, and 
to her motor and grasping skills, there is no chance for her but to hit upon gold. 
Despite all this, her success is in a relevant sense accidental. It was by a stroke of  
luck that Goldie hit upon gold.
It would be very tempting to think in the following terms. What this case 
suggests is that it is not enough for an environment to be safe that a particular area 
ability that, by hypothesis, could not fall short of  knowledge for appreciating that a detached 
environment always is a mimic. By rejecting that ability, anti-luck virtue epistemologists 
would commit themselves to the claim that knowledge is impossible. By rejecting that a safe 
environment is a mimic, the very notion of  knowledge would collapse.
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happens to be safe. It is also required that the agent could not easily be situated within 
an unsafe area, or, in other words, that the situation could not easily be unsafe. In 
this sense, it is only when Goldie might easily step into a modally close room that 
contains objects made from different metals and alloys that she lacks knowledge. 
The suggestion is thus that of  reading the safety clause as a super-strong safety, one 
that is met in cases where factors that would make the area unsafe are remote 
possibilities not liable to occur. Those possibilities would be too distant to count 
as relevant for knowledge.
This move could allow anti-luck virtue epistemologists to deal with cases 
such as DARK ROOM23 without abandoning their intuitions. The trouble is that 
those cases point to an opposite direction. It is not that Goldie lacks knowledge 
because she might too easily be wrongly situated, but because, no matter how 
strong the safety of  the environment is, her high epistemic standing would not be due to 
the exercise of  a competence. Her success as a knower would still be accidental, even 
if, unbeknownst to her, in and around her position there only were rooms that 
contain gold.24 As, in spite of  the same behaviour, there is all the difference in the 
world between acting (systematically but accidentally) according to a rule and rule-
following in virtue of  dispositional constitutions, there is an analogous distinction 
between safely but accidentally collecting truths and achieving knowledgeable 
truths by competence. The point is thus that the environment, whether weakly 
or strongly safe, provides the causal explanation of  a success that, falling short 
of  competence, is accidental. The environment is not magically transmuted into 
23 This family of  cases include the example of  Simone (Sosa 2015, 146-53), that of  the 
randomizing demon that allows his victims to form an extensive class of  apt beliefs in an 
environment that just happens to be safe while at any moment the demon could easily be 
operative, and that of  Barney’s forming the apt belief  that a barn is in front of  him within 
a safe environment while, unbeknownst to him, the town council has decided to raise many 
barn-façades, so that Barney could have easily been in an unsafe area. 
24 A quite different (but equally pressing) worry arises from the Pyrrhonian intuition that what 
explains that Goldie does not know is that she cannot properly claim that she has hit upon the truth. 
On this view, one that takes as primary for a proper account of  knowledge the first-person 
perspective of  the performer, neither a safe environment nor the manifestation of  a competence 
that would be unavailable from the internal perspective of  the agent would be sufficient to 
yield knowledge. Competent or not, the success would be accidental for the performer. Both 
Pyrrhonians and Classical Internalists take this argument as decisive to undermine any variety 
of  externalism in epistemology, including any member of  the family ‘virtue epistemology’. It 
remains to see whether Sosa’s virtue perspectivism has the appropriate resources to meet this 
challenge. More on this later. 
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the factor that confer epistemic dispositions to the agent by adding stability to it. 
Universal mimics are still mimics.
Where does this leave us? We seem to be threatened by an impasse of  sorts. 
Both robust virtue epistemologists and anti-luck virtue epistemologists face 
serious problems. The former theorists seem unable to explain Barney’s lack of  
knowledge by appealing to factors intrinsic to his abilities. The latter ones fail 
at distinguishing between cases of  knowledge and cases of  mimicking, so that, 
paraphrasing Nietzsche, they banish competences out the front door only to rush 
to the back door to let accidentality in. The problem is that accidentality will 
come to remain, and that epistemologists would then have no other option but to 
leave. It seems thus clear that anti-luck virtue epistemologists have succumbed to 
a philosophical error alarmingly prominent: that of  continuing to rely implicitly 
upon something, in this case a conception of  knowledge such that the connection 
between competence and environment is so strong as to be considered as an internal 
relation, that they are explicitly repudiating in their positive view.
The solution is to find a competence that combines with a modally thick 
environment, one such that the overall situation is loaded into the conditions for 
the manifestation of  the competence. A question remains. Could an anti-luck 
virtue epistemologist take the only remaining safe path while retaining the core 
of  her theory?
3. ExtrinsiC and PartiaLLy intrinsiC CognitivE disPositions
Haunted by mimics, anti-luck virtue epistemologists would easily be tempted 
to explore two more avenues that, while according to a (yet to be determined) 
competence a main role in explaining knowledge, make of  the situation (whether 
a narrow situation or one so extensive as to include nomological facts about the 
actual world) the crucial factor for that purpose. The point would be that, anti-
luck virtue epistemologists being unable to get rid of  competences paired to 
modally thick environments for explaining knowledge, it is still open for them to 
explain those very abilities (or their pairing to a class of  environments) in terms 
of  extrinsic factors, so that virtues alone would never be able to confer the cognitive 
dispositions relevant for knowledge on their bearers. This strategy would yield 
a dual-condition view of  sorts, one where, instead of  an additional factor to 
competences, the safe environment is one of  the factors that constitute them. It 
would also be instrumental for anti-luck virtue epistemologists in avoiding the 
pitfall of  mimics. After all, if  safe environments constitute competences, there is 
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no prima facie plausible way to draw a contrast between the exercise of  an ability 
and the environment seen as a mimic. On this model, it would be the right kind 
of  situation that makes S to be disposed to get knowledge by using her cognitive 
ability, or, alternatively, it would be an extrinsic factor that which rightly connects 
the competence and the situation. One could thus go externalist while firmly 
rooted in the agent’s capacities.
Let us consider the first alternative, that of  viewing the dispositions relevant 
for knowledge as extrinsic dispositions.
In the literature about powers and dispositions, an extrinsic disposition is, 
contrary to intrinsic dispositions that either supervene or are identical to the categorical 
properties of  the object,25 one that an object acquires and loses without undergoing 
some intrinsic change. This means that an extrinsic disposition is not hosted by the 
object intrinsically, to wit, that it is one that is directed to a particular partner for mutual 
manifestation in such a way that the factor that provides the disposition is the causal 
context. The tip of  a screwdriver fits in this particular slotted screw head, so that, were 
it to be inserted in the slots, the process of  losing the panels encasing the boiler 
would start. However, were the slots of  the screw head changed, the screwdriver 
would lose its disposition to fit this particular screw head without suffering any 
change whatever. Externalism thus enters into the account of  dispositions.
Analogously, one may claim that the bearer of  an intrinsic cognitive disposition 
that, directed to a modally thin situational partner, falls short of  knowledge, 
acquires an extrinsic disposition to knowledge (or, better said, an extrinsic disposition 
directed to the same dispositional partner as before, but that is manifested as 
knowledge) in virtue of  a causal context that provides the disposition. Knowledge 
25 In the discussion that follows, I will remain neutral on the controversial issue of  the 
metaphysical relation between dispositional and categorical properties. It is, however, 
important to notice that the standard view forcefully proposed by Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
(Prior, Pargetter & Jackson 1982, 251-7), and, according to which, dispositional properties are 
grounded on prior categorical properties, has increasingly come under attack. It is rejected by 
pure dispositionalists such as Hugh Mellor (Mellor 1991, 104-22), who reduces the basic furniture 
of  the universe to dispositional webs, by ‘dualists’ such as George Molnar (Molnar 2003, 148-
53), and by advocates of  the ‘surprising identity’ theory and the Limit View, who consider the 
purely qualitative and the purely dispositional as the two sides of  the same coin, that is, as 
the unrealizable limits (pure actuality and pure potentiality) of  the same property (see Martin 
2008, 54-79). For metaphysical reasons I would endorse the Limit View, as well as a two-
categories ontology of  substances and properties (where the latter are understood as modes 
of  a substance). 
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would thus be based on the agent’s ability, but this ability would be made true by 
the safe environment that is partially responsible for conferring it to the agent. 
As a result, the safe environment becomes to all effects a causal power. The safety 
condition and the ability condition would thus be interlocked in such a way that 
mimics are avoided.
However, how could extrinsic dispositions be distinguished from cases of  
mimicking? There is, after all, an intuitive distinction between them, one that is 
made vivid by the contrast between the screwdriver that is extrinsically disposed 
to fit this particular screw head and a screwdriver that, lacking the proper shape 
and disposition, would have never unscrewed it but for the lucky intervention 
of  a guardian angel. So, where does the difference lie? There is no possible 
doubt about the right answer: it is in the fact that, contrary to what happens 
with mimics, extrinsic dispositions rely on the intrinsic dispositions and intrinsic 
properties of  their bearers. An account of  the right relation between intrinsic and 
extrinsic dispositions thus is required to draw a principled distinction between 
cases of  knowledge and cases of  mimicking. The question for anti-luck virtue 
epistemologists that take this route is whether they have the appropriate means 
for that purpose.
At this point, one may be tempted to claim that the role played by intrinsic 
cognitive dispositions for the acquisition of  knowledge would be that of  being 
part of  the causal basis for the extrinsic disposition to rightly obtain. The difference 
between mimics and extrinsic dispositions would thus lie in the fact that, only for 
the latter, intrinsic dispositions are causally operative for the result to obtain. The point would 
be that intrinsic cognitive dispositions are part of  the sufficient causal conditions for 
the external disposition to obtain and be manifested as a high standing epistemic 
success when in the appropriate conditions, so that, were the agent bereft of  
the intrinsic epistemic ability that causally contributes to her extrinsic ability for 
getting knowledge, she would not succeed as a knower.
The problem for this view is that the inner disposition could easily be causally 
operative (even in a regular and systematic way) for the result to obtain, while 
compatible with mimicking.
Consider, for example, a perceptually competent agent that gains a disposition 
to know within a safe environment partially on the basis of  her perceptual ability. 
The causal account would (at first sight rightly) classify this ability to know as 
an extrinsic disposition. However, had an intervening demon decided to cast a 
spell such that epistemic agents would hit the target of  knowledge only if  they 
are perceptually competent, the intrinsic disposition would be causally relevant for 
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the outcome, while, owing to the fact that its causal contribution falls under the 
jurisdiction of  the demon, this would be a standard mimic.
Doubtless some readers would indignantly protest against the previous 
argument. After all, and since it is at the very least misleading to describe a cognitive 
success due to the interfering demon as knowledge, it is the causal role played by 
the safe environment that explains the extrinsic ability and its right manifestation. 
However, the critic is missing the point of  the argument. The question is whether 
causally operative intrinsic dispositions are the factor that differentiates extrinsic 
dispositions from mimics. And the answer is negative. Since causal contribution 
is compatible with mimicking, a causal relation between intrinsic and extrinsic 
dispositions is not the kind of  relation that is right. The problem is that, deprived 
of  such relation, the only way to capture the distinction at issue would be by 
appealing to the supposed difference between safe environments and mimics. 
This move is precluded by the arguments of  the previous section, so that if  there 
is something misleading in this discussion, it is to describe a cognitive success due 
to the causal powers of  the safe environment as a case of  knowledge.
There is, however, an alternative. It is possible to replace a causal relation by 
a grounding relation such that, contrary to what happens with mimics, the intrinsic 
disposition underlies the extrinsic disposition and is also manifested in the success 
of  the latter.
This conception, that in my view provides the correct ontological picture of  
the relation between intrinsic and extrinsic dispositions, is made intuitive when 
considering the former as general dispositions directed to the same kind of  partners, 
and the latter as dispositions relative to a particular partner that falls under the class 
specified by the directedness of  the underwriting intrinsic disposition.
The thing is that the extrinsic disposition of  this screwdriver to fit that screw 
head, a disposition that the former would lose without undergoing any change, 
is based on the screwdriver intrinsic disposition to fit screw heads slotted as this 
one is. This intrinsic disposition is retained as long as the shape and constitution 
of  the tool are the same. It is required for the extrinsic disposition to be genuine. 
It is manifested in the success of  the fitting. Crucially, it does have a content and 
directedness that, although general and indeterminate to a concrete individual, 
are constitutively included in the particularly determinate, broader, and highly 
externalized content of  the extrinsic disposition. In short, extrinsic dispositions 
hold in virtue of  the features of  the causal context. This does not mean, however, 
that they are true only in virtue of  that factor. On the contrary, they are also true 
in virtue of  the intrinsic character of  the innermost disposition on which are 
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grounded.26 The point is thus that intrinsic dispositions, instead of  being causally 
operative for the result to obtain, are manifested in that result as such. Mimics are 
by definition cases in which such manifestation does not occur.
Unfortunately for the advocates of  extrinsic dispositions to knowledge, 
however, the grounding model is not applicable to their case. On their view, the 
intrinsic cognitive ability that underwrites the extrinsic ability is not—emphatically 
not—a general disposition directed to an infinite, but bounded, series of  
manifestations as knowledge under the right circumstances, one such that it 
would be retained by the agent even when there is a manifestation failure, and 
whose content and directedness are included in the directedness and content 
of  the extrinsic disposition. Furthermore, on this model the intrinsic and the 
extrinsic dispositions are not simultaneously manifested in the same event under 
two different descriptions: as the screwdriver fitting this particular screw head, 
and as the screwdriver fitting a type of  screw heads. The contents of  the two 
dispositions do not match in the right way. Which curiously means that on this 
view there is not logical space for the relevant extrinsic cognitive dispositions at 
all. On reflection, this prima facie attractive route is logically precluded.
According to anti-luck virtue epistemologists knowledge is not explained by 
intrinsic dispositions. Extrinsic dispositions are likewise ruled out on account of  
their nature. Those categories being exhaustive, it seems as if  a theory of  this sort 
should be definitively rejected.
However, the next (and last) alternative for anti-luck virtue epistemologists is 
that of  going internalist, but with a twist. In general metaphysics, nomic theories 
have been prevalent until recent times.27 There is no visible reason for not using 
them for epistemological purposes at a last resort.
At the core of  this theory is the claim that the cognitive competences 
relevant for knowledge (those that, hypothetically, are paired to a modally thick 
safe environment) are partially intrinsic dispositions, to wit, that they are not only 
directed to the right environment for a mutual manifestation as knowledge in 
virtue of  their intrinsic nature, but also in virtue of  a fixed background of  nomic 
necessities that function as nomic links, and that constitute nomological facts of  
26 This is just the point of  Sosa’s early account of  the content of  concepts (Sosa 1993, 323-
4). As usual, he was not only right on that particular issue, but opened the path for a broader 
application of  his view to general metaphysics.
27 The classical (and, plausibly, the most detailed) formulation of  this view is the one proposed 
by Armstrong (1997, 220-62).
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the actual world. The point is thus that the epistemic dispositions relevant for 
knowledge are partly internal and partly external, or, in other words, that they can 
be lost under two different conditions: a change in the innermost competence 
of  the agent, and a change of  the laws that make that disposition appropriately 
operative. Importantly, those nomic necessities are metaphysically contingent, in 
the sense that in other possible worlds with different laws the same intrinsic 
disposition would yield different results (or no result at all). They are also extrinsic 
to the disposition, since they are not built into its contents. However, accidentality 
seems neatly avoided: once the law is kept fixed, there is no room for a lucky strike 
to occur.
It seems to me that the motivation for this final metamorphosis of  anti-luck 
virtue epistemology would simply be dialectical: the avoidance of  a robust virtue 
epistemology. However, it is worthwhile considering whether on further reflection 
this alternative is feasible.
To this end, consider the exact duplicate of  an epistemic agent within a 
demon world. It would be plausible to claim that, owing to the interfering demon, 
the appropriate conditions for the manifestation of  the agent’s cognitive abilities 
are blocked, but that, crucially, her epistemic competences, however inhibited for 
manifestation, remain. On this intuitive view, the demon world is classified as a 
standard case of  failure of  manifestation.
Now consider how a nomic theorist would deal with the previous case. 
The demon world is such as not to be constituted by the nomological facts that 
constitute the actual world.28 The structural epistemic constitution, as well as the 
intrinsic nature of  the relevant cognitive disposition, are the same for the agent 
within the actual world and for her counterpart. However, and since the extrinsic 
law that partially constitutes the epistemic competence does not hold in the demon 
world, the latter is deprived of  her epistemic competence. It is not only that the 
competence fails to be manifested, but that the competence itself, and without the 
agent undergoing any intrinsic change, pops in and out of  existence for no other 
reason than a change of  location. There is an aura of  irreality around this view.
However, the main problem concerns the role played on this theory by the 
intrinsic aspect of  competences that, after all, are partially intrinsic. Do they have 
28 If  the reader is not entirely satisfied by a demon world ruled by caprice, it is equally valid for 
the argument to replace it by a world constituted by a different set of  nomological facts from 
those holding in the actual world. 
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an intrinsic content and directedness to reciprocal manifestation with the right 
dispositional partners? An intrinsic for-ness towards fruitful togetherness? No, 
because such content is borrowed (from world to world, as it were) from the 
extrinsic law that connects the nature to the behaviour of  the agent, and that it 
does so in such a way that a robust anti-realism about dispositions immediately 
follows. But this means that nature and intrinsic dispositional content dissolve 
into air, and that the intrinsic disposition is only effective as an occasional cause, 
that is, as a stimulus for the law to operate. With this we complete the circle by 
going back to a causal account of  dispositions that, besides taking their dispositional 
character away, makes it impossible to distinguish competences from mimics. As 
a matter of  fact, there is no ontological distinction between laws and universal 
and regular mimics. Which means that, when describing how epistemic abilities 
operate in the actual world, nomic theorists are really describing the world of  a 
benevolent demon, one in which, while the acquisition of  true beliefs is regular 
and systematic, the acquisition of  knowledge is impossible. This is a world where 
inert epistemic agents are propelled by external forces, and where the constitution 
of  the agent is only relevant, if  at all, in the same way as dumbbells made of  iron 
are relevant for a hovering fiend that casts a spell for all iron objects to be zapped 
when lightly touched.29
The conclusion is that the explanation of  knowledge requires it to be grounded 
on real dispositions, where real dispositions are the building blocks underpinning the 
world and its regularities. As I said before, the first condition for making such 
explanation possible is by keeping the distinction between the conditions for the 
possession and the conditions for the manifestation of  a disposition fixed.
4. highEr-ordEr EPistEMiC disPositions
Few contemporary epistemologists have been as aware of  the Pyrrhonian 
problematic as Sosa is.30 On the one hand, Sosa’s prolonged and careful dealing 
with this topic is a main factor to explain his view of  the limited character and the 
29 For zapper-dependent dispositions, see Sosa (2015, 23).
30 Descartes also was fully aware of  this problematic, to the point of  it being plausible to claim 
that he inherited from his Pyrrhonian predecessors a bi-level conception of  the structure of  
knowledge, and that his epistemological project was mainly directed to make it possible a 
successful escape from the Agrippan net, and thus, to show that knowledge is after all possible. 
There is a direct line from Pyrrhonian epistemology through Descartes to Sosa. 
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inadequacy of  purely externalist accounts of  knowledge,31 his endorsement of  a bi-
level epistemology, and his project of  a healthy integration between the domain of  
animal functionings and the epistemic perspective proper of  rational agents. On the 
other hand, Sosa’s full appreciation of  the Agrippan Trilemma has been instrumental 
for his defence of  virtuous (and Cartesian) circularity, and for his rich and multi-level 
account of  what it means for an agent to possess an epistemic perspective.
It is thus curious to notice how the other major strand of  his epistemology 
—the competence account of  knowledge—, one that is firmly connected to robust 
varieties of  externalism, has come to effortlessly combine with the direction that 
epistemology has to take under the pressure of  Pyrrhonian intuitions. The high-
order competences of  the rational agent are waiting at the end of  both roads. And 
those competences, far from being the lurid floating debris and the epiphenomenal 
residuum of  overdetermined first-order virtues, are instrumental to the constitution 
of  knowledge and the reinforcement of  the first-order abilities that underlie them. 
Barney’s problem has proved to be the right opportunity that entwines rational 
integration as well as knowledge explanation to provide a fruitful coherence.
Sosa deals with this problem by considering two interrelated scenarios (Sosa 
2015, 146-53) that involve a pilot in training (Simone), and that are respectively 
analogous to Barney’s standard case, and to the case of  Barney’s counterpart 
within an environment that happens to be safe, but that it could easily be unsafe.
On the first scenario, Simone is shooting targets within a simulation cockpit 
that, unbeknownst to her, includes a screen such that sometimes is transparent 
(and Simone shoots at real targets) and sometimes reproduces holograms visually 
indiscernible from real targets. On the target-occasion she is successfully shooting 
real targets, and having a true belief  about that event.
31 There is a parallel here with the Pyrrhonian critique of  the pure externalism advanced by 
the Stoics, and with the Pyrrhonian insistence on claiming that it is not coherent (and thus, 
that it is not rational) for an epistemic agent to believe that p while not believing whether she 
is justified in so believing (or while believing that she is not justified in so believing). [The 
transcendental argument that Sosa proposes at the end of  Knowing Full Well hinges on the latter 
point. See Sosa (2011, 154-7).]
It seems, however, that the Pyrrhonians opposed some (but not all) varieties of  Stoicism. After 
all, Cicero informs us that Zeno made a distinction between perceptual cognition and scientific 
knowledge. Something that seems confirmed by Strabo when describing the Stoics as claiming 
that scientific knowledge is a form of  cognition such that it is “secure and unchangeable by 
reason” (Long & Sedley 2014, 256 H1). This seems to support that at least some prominent 
members of  the Stoa endorsed a bi-level epistemology. 
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On the second scenario, Simone is carried blindfolded to a real cockpit in a 
real aircraft. She believes that at this stage of  her training she always is piloting 
aircrafts. However, and unbeknownst to her, sometimes she is led to the simulation 
cockpit. On the target-occasion she is successfully shooting real targets aloft, and 
having a true belief  about that event.
Unsurprisingly, Sosa considers that Simone lacks knowledge in the two cases even 
though she is forming true and apt beliefs on the basis of  her faultless perceptual 
competence. However, and contrary to what happens with anti-luck virtue episte-
mologists, he does not provide an explanation of  Simone’s epistemic shortcomings in 
terms of  the unsafety (or, as in the second scenario, of  the weak safety) of  Simone’s 
surroundings. Sosa rather classifies those cases as instances of  manifestation failure.
Manifestation failure of  what? Granted that Simone is not just guessing,32 to wit, 
that she is not just affirming with the limited aim of  getting her affirmation right 
(Sosa 2015, 75), but that she is affirming in the endeavour to affirm aptly,33 the 
answer is: a failure of  her assessment of  the epistemic situation such that, because she 
is not guided to the aptness of  her beliefs by the aptness of  that assessment, her 
beliefs are deprived of  the full aptness that constitutes knowledge. The crux is thus 
that, while on the first scenario, and even though Simone forms a true second-order 
belief that were she to affirm that she is shooting real targets her affirmation will be 
true, her second-order belief  that her affirmation would be apt (a second-order belief  
whose truth depends on the modally thick situation) is false, on the second scenario 
her second-order belief  that her affirmation would be apt is, though true, inapt. 
In the latter case, her judgmental competence is not manifested in the success of  her 
judgment due to how easily she might be badly situated. Proper rational guidance 
thus is the all-important factor that explains knowledge and the lack of  it. Deprived 
of  it, true, and even apt beliefs are, in one sense or another, merely accidental.
32 Guessing is compatible with first-order aptness, as Sosa’s example of  the eye-exam (Sosa 
2015, 74-81) makes perfectly clear. However, it automatically deprives a true and apt belief  of  
the full aptness required for proper knowledge. Recall at this point the distinction made by the 
Stoics between a mere cognition and knowledge proper (see the previous footnote). 
33 This is how Sosa defines the act of  judging, an act that goes well beyond the resultant 
seemings and the functional beliefs of  first-order mechanisms, and that is proper of  rational 
and volitional agents able to evaluate their first-order performances in view of  a larger picture 
(of  an epistemic perspective) that takes into account the reliability of  first-order dispositions, 
and that includes an appreciation of  the situation, and arguments pro and con that are properly 
pondered. Crucially, the agent’s epistemic performances have to be guided to aptness by apt 
judging for achieving the status of  knowledge. See Sosa (2015, 150-1). 
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Importantly, the role played on this model by the modally thick situation is not 
that of  a detached and additional factor. A strongly safe situation is just the right dis-
positional partner of  the judgemental competence for mutual manifestation as fully apt 
belief. It is not that the environment has to be strongly safe period. Rather, it has to 
be strongly safe for its reciprocity to the second-order competence of  the epistemic 
agent. This means that, though the background situational conditions for the mani-
festation of  the competence are as operative as the latter for the result to obtain34, the 
right situations are included in the content and directedness of  the second-order 
cognitive disposition as the conditions for its manifestation as knowledge. A meta-
physical analysis of  knowledge is thus provided, so that an ontological explanation 
of  knowledge such that excludes Humean contingency is finally achieved.
Humean contingency may have well been avoided. However, the Pyrrhonian 
challenge as to why a complete competence that is not epistemically available to 
the experience of  the performer (and that, in effect, is available to no one short of  
an omniscient God) is not a lucky success remains to be answered. The problem is 
not about the defeasible character of  judgments, but about the fact that, even if  all 
the assessments of  the first-order abilities within a certain domain were infallible 
by virtue of  the infallible nature of  the target-competences, the agent would be 
deprived of  access to what happens. From her perspective, a series of  systematic 
and metaphysically grounded successes would be accidental.
But, what exactly is the challenge? As I read the Pyrrhonians, the challenge 
is not—emphatically not—about the nature of  knowledge, as if  the Pyrrhonians 
would be claiming that, because S does not know that she knows that p, she 
does not know that p. To my mind, the Pyrrhonians are not committed to the 
controversial KK principle, a commitment that would prove to be the Achilles 
heel for their position. Plausibly, they would concede that the precedent picture is 
able to capture the nature of  knowledge and to provide a right way of  dealing with 
ontological accidentality. Their worries are about perspectival accidentality.
But then and again, what exactly is the challenge? It is about the proper rational 
attitudes to take for a rational agent. On the one hand, S knows that p because her 
judgment that p is apt. On the other hand, S’s judgment that, because her judgment 
34 This is why, in a previous note, I expressed my reservations regarding an analysis of  
manifestation in terms of  operative competences and background conditions. Both factors are 
equally operative. Which means that talk about background conditions always is relative to the 
interests of  the theorist that wants to make salient a particular factor. There is nothing intrinsically 
wrong in such partial consideration. However, philosophical caution is highly recommended. 
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that p is apt, she knows that p, would never be apt. The Agrippan Trilemma is 
directed to make the agent aware of  the last point. But with this awareness comes 
a full appreciation of  the agent’s cognitive disintegration. The point is that the agent 
would not be justified in claiming that her judgment is apt, so that she would be 
doomed to judge that p while not believing that she is justified in so judging. There 
would thus be a discrepancy between the rational attitude (suspension of  judgment) 
that she should take towards her judgment and her natural gravitation towards 
judgment. The agent would be, in this sense, blind to her knowledge: she would possess 
it, while prevented by the Pyrrhonian net to attribute knowledge to herself  and to 
claim that she has knowledge. Absent silence, the agent would thus be charged 
with incoherence and irrationality.
Though the Pyrrhonian argument is perfectly valid regarding pure reliabilist 
accounts of  knowledge, accounts which create an unbridgeable gap between 
rational justification and brute possession of  knowledge, it is far from clear that 
it would be effective against Sosa’ more sophisticated view. Sosa is too great a 
philosopher not to have defined the danger when he creates the safety. And the 
safety is, precisely, the judgmental competence.
The crux is that an agent that judges is not blind to her knowledge. What 
this means is not that the agent cannot go wrong, but that, even when mistaken, 
and because she is taking into account the relevant factors to rationally guide her 
belief  to aptness (even if  only implicitly), she is justified in so judging. Rational 
guidance being part of  the explanation of  why the agent has achieved knowledge, 
rational justification and knowledge possession do not come apart.
At this point the Pyrrhonian would insist that there is no possible gap to escape 
from the Agrippan Trilemma, and thus, that, the natural inclination to take for granted 
the reliability of  our faculties being deprived of  any epistemic status, there is a clash 
between the claims of  reason and the force of  nature. The main question is thus 
whether the Agrippa Trilemma deprives epistemic agents of  rational justification, 
where ‘rational justification’ is justification enough to rightly claim that one knows.
Notice, firstly, that the Pyrrhonian argument (as constructed above) proceeds 
from the claim that, in virtue of  the Agrippan Trilemma, the agent cannot aptly 
judge that she possesses knowledge, so that when ascribing knowledge to herself  
the agent always is, if  right, accidentally so, to the conclusion that the agent is 
never justified to claim that she possesses knowledge. However, the entailment does 
not work. The question is not whether the agent can infallibly ascribe knowledge 
to herself, but whether she is justified in claiming knowledge. The point is that 
rational justification does not mean infallibility, so that the proper rational attitude 
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to take for an agent could be that of  affirming while fully aware of  the defeasibility 
of  such affirmation. If  the Agrippan Trilemma only affects invulnerable claims of  
knowledge, then it cuts no ice for the issue at hand.
But, what about our basic and natural trust in the reliability of  our cognitive 
competences? Is not the Agrippan Trilemma instrumental to make us aware of  the 
irrationality of  such attitude? The problem for the Pyrrhonians here is that there 
is no clear contrast between the claims of  reason and the imperatives of  nature. 
On the one hand, our competences are improved and refined through reason and 
experience, so that they are epistemically reinforced and gain epistemic status 
throughout the years. There is all the difference in the world between the blind 
trust of  early childhood and the responsible consideration proper of  rational and 
mature agents, even if  the latter is built onto the former. On the other hand, the 
‘teachings of  nature’ are neither fleeting opinions nor blind instincts. It is plausible 
to claim, as Descartes did, that they come with the mark of  the silent approval 
of  reason. All in all, the Pyrrhonian arguments seem only able to deprive certain 
natural commitments of  metaphysical certainty. However, they do not make 
them improbable enough as to create equipollence and to support suspension. 
Discrepancy is thus replaced by integration.35
The conclusion is that Sosa’s complex and consistent view is not only able to 
successfully provide an ontological analysis of  knowledge, but to do it in such a way 
that it also breaks the Pyrrhonian impasse. It is important, however, to consolidate 
and to explore, if  only because of  the huge consequences for epistemology of  
taking such revolutionary step towards metaphysical analysis, a step that implies 
that conceptual analysis alone cuts no ontological ice.
35 As a matter of  fact, the Pyrrhonian challenge might be met in a straight way, either by 
arguing that, because it makes no sense to talk about the rational attitude for the agent to 
take without endorsing the general reliability of  our cognitive competences, the Pyrrhonians 
cannot coherently contrast the claims of  reason with the force of  nature (this is the procedure 
used by Sosa in his transcendental argument), or by taking up the project of  self-validating 
reason, an internal project that makes good use of  the deliverances of  reason to reduce radical 
scepticism to absurdity (this is the Cartesian procedure to deal with the Pyrrhonian challenge). 
Importantly, both projects proceed by virtuous circularity. It is also significant to note that 
their function is not that of  providing justification to the agent’s claim of  knowledge, as if  one 
were unjustified before engaging in technical and demanding arguments, but that of  providing 
a conviction so firm that, unchangeable by reason, could beat the sceptic even in his own 
terrain. Thus, there are cases in which the agent would have a knowing grasp of  the fact that she 
knows. In those cases, the possession of  knowledge is fully available to the epistemic subject. 
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For one thing, competences and powers being multi-track, blockers, mimics 
and inhibitors are perspectival in the sense of  being relative to the interests 
of  the describer and of  the epistemic community. There is thus room within 
metaphysical analysis for a social epistemology, so that one can coherently endorse 
a robust realism regarding the bases of  our taxonomies while according to them a 
contextual and relativized function.
It is also relevant to notice that manifestation is an internal relation, one such 
that the outcome is simultaneous with the reciprocity of  its dispositional bases. It 
is not only that internal relations are beyond the grasp of  traditional (Humean) 
conceptions of  causality, but that they could plausibly shed new light on causality 
itself. It would be worthwhile exploring whether and to what extent (external) 
causal relations could be reduced to (internal) relations of  reciprocal manifestation.
But the problem that, at least to my mind, seems more pressing is that of  
elucidating the ontological status of  epistemic manifestations, so that the troubled 
waters between ontological anti-realism and ontological inflation may be navigated. 
One way to put this problem is to say that the contrast between cognitive 
dispositions and their manifestations suggests a further contrast between the 
manifest and the ontological image of  knowledge. The same point could be put 
by saying that, truths about knowledge being relational truths, it is relevant to 
determine whether their truthmakers are non-relational features of  the world. If  
this were the right answer, there would be room within a virtue epistemology for a 
view that combines a robust realism regarding the truth of  knowledge ascriptions 
with an unequivocal rejection (because ontological features would be that which 
make them true) of  supervenient levels of  reality. On this view, the conceptual 
and the ontological discourses would be mutually irreducible ways of  representing 
the same world.
The fact remains: Sosa has broken the hold of  Humean contingency in 
epistemology. This places his true stature as a philosopher in proper perspective.36
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